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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

.

CELESTE BOTT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs-

..

MARY TURNER BOTT,

Case No. 11266

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This matter arises out of an order of the court finding
appellant in contempt of court for failing to comply with

an order in a decree of divorce requiring the appellant
to pay a certain sum in lieu of alimony.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, held appellant in contempt of
court and sentenced him to 15 days in the Salt Lake County
jail, for failing to obey the decree of divorce ordering

appellant to pay respondent $2400.00 at the rate of $200.00
P~t rnonth for one year.

The court also enjoined appellant

from continuing an independent action against respondent
for personal property claims which had been adjudicated
by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins in an earlier hearing.

This

case was previously before this Court in Bott v. Bott,
/

20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the court should affirm the
trial court's judgment finding appellant in contempt of
' court and sentencing him to 15 days in the county jail.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from an order of the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Joseph G.
Jeppson, Judge, dated May 2, 1968 (R. 82, 83).

The

appellant seeks reversal of the court's order finding
him in contempt of court, and sentencing him to 15 days

in the county jail therefor.

Appellant also seeks reversal

of the court's order restraining him from continuing Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil

No. 178623, Celeste Bott, plaintiff, vs. Mary Turner

Bott, defendant.
Appellant filed a complaint against respondent for

a·ivorce

on April 7, 1966 (R. 1, 2)

The respondent answered

anct counterclaimed against appellant for divorce on April 18,
1'!66.

b

(R. 6, 9)

The court granted appellant a divorce

on his complaint and also granted respondent a divorce on
her counterclaim.
A decree signed by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
was filed July 27, 1966 (R. 27, 28).

The decree granted

all of the real property of appellant to appellant free of
all claims of respondent.

Each party was awarded their

own separate bank accounts.
1

b

Respondent was awarded some

specific items of personal property and all of her personal
belongings remaining in the appellant's home.

Upon res-

pendent' s motion (R. 34), the court filed a further
memorandum decision dated September 23, 1966 (R. 32, 33),
granting respondent additional items of personal property.
The decree also ordered appellant to pay respondent "in
lieu of alimony" $2400.00 payable $200.00 per month for
one year without interest.
On June 7, 1967, respondent caused an order to show
cause to be issued ordering appellant to appear and show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for
Willfully failing to comply with the above decree and
further memorandum decision. (R. 35)

The court, Judge

D. F. Wilkins presiding, filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law

'

and order on the order to show cause

hea ·
ring July 6, 1967 (R. 37, 40). The court found as a
ruattu of fact that appellant had $45.00 worth of res-

-3-

pondent's personal property and that respondent had $90.00
worth of appellant's personal property.

The court after

adjusting accounts between the parties granted appellant's
claim of setoff to the extent of $45.00.

The court also

found that the appellant had willfully refused to pay

$2000.00 of the alimony settlement and sentenced him to

five days in the county jail for contempt of court.

The

court granted a four month stay of execution in which
appellant could purge himself of the contempt.
Appellant appealed this decision to this court.
Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968).

This

court held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to find appellant in contempt of court because a
supporting affidavit had not been filed as required by
78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

The court also held

that the district court did have jurisdiction over the

parties to settle the personai property dispute and affirmed
the district court's decision in this regard.

After rendition of the court's prior decision, resPondent caused another order to show cause to be issued
(R. 76) this time supported by a proper affidavit ..

(R. 77)

The

· appellant was ordered to appear and show cause why he

should not be held in contempt of court for willful failure

-4-

to pay respondent $2000.00 of her alimony settlement and

why he should not be "enjoined from pursuing a suit filed
against respondent in the district court for property claims
adjusted herein on 7-6-68."

The court filed it's finding

of facts and order on May 2, 1968. (R. 82, 83)

The district

court found appellant in contempt of court for failure to
obey the divorce decree, and sentenced him to 15 days in
the county jail-.

The court also found as a matter of fact

that the property claims involved in the appellant's independent suit against respondent were settled at the hearing
held before Judge D. F. Wilkins on June 21, 1967, and
restrained the appellant from continuing the suit.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT TRYING TO COLLECT A

DEBT BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDING BUT WAS ENFORCING
THE COURT'S ORDER TO PAY A SUM IN LIEU OF
ALIMONY.
The appellant contends that the imposition of a jail
sentence for contempt of court, because he refused to pay
:he award of $2400.00 "in lieu of alimony," violated Utah

~nstitution, Article I, Section 16, forbidding imprisonment
:or debt.

However, the appellant concedes that the court

tay enforce the payment of alimony and support money by
:oritPn1µt of court proceedings but contends that the $2400.00
iward "in lieu of alimony" was a property settlement and
_r:;_

therefore could not be enforced by contempt proceedings.
The basis for a court's contempt power in alimony cases
is explained in Browing, Enforcement of Divorce Decrees
and Settlements by Contempt and Imprisonment in California,
9 Hast. L.J. 57 (1957) at P.60 as follows:

"it would seem

that the distinction between a 'debt' as alluded to in the
state constitutional provision, and 'alimony' in that the
former relates ,to business transactions, whereas alimony
arises from the marital obligations of the husband."
· Respondent submits that the trial court in awarding
appellant $2400.00 "in lieu of alimony" was not making a
property settlement but was making a lump sum award in
settlement of alimony.

Judge Wilkins so recognized the

award in his finding of fact dated July 6, 1967, on the
first order to show cause hearing.

Judge Wilkins there

referred to the award as an "alimony settlement".

A lump

sum award in lieu of alimony has been recognized as proper
in the following cases decided by this court:

Pinion v.

~nion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937); Bader v. Bader,

18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 (1967); Peters v. Peters,

15 Utah 2d 71 394 P.2d 71 (1964).

The court used the term "in lieu of alimony" in the
Pet-ecs
1

case and "in lieu of all claims for alimony" in the

i,_,n '-rise to describe the lump sum alimony award.

i '1

-6-

It is

apparent from those cases that the term "in lieu of alimony"
is used to designate a lump sum.alimony settlement, not a
property settlement.
It should be pointed out that the authority cited by
appellant in support of his position, Bradley v. Superior

-

court, 310 P.2d 634 (Cal. 1957) and Stone

v.

Stidhum, 96

Ariz. 235, 393 P.2d 923 (1964), involved property settlements
and so would not be controlling in the present case.
In the divorce decree and the further memorandum

decision, the court was specific in dividing the property
between appellant and respondent.

The appellant was

awarded all of his real property free of all claims of
respondent, each party was awarded

th.~ir

separate bank

accounts, and respondent was awarded her personal belongings
remaining in appellant's home.

This was the property

settlement not the award "in lieu of alimony".

If the

court would have meant the award of $2400.00 to be part
of the property settlement, this item would have been

included in the award relating to the division of property.
The respondent also submits that the appellant was not
being imprisoned for debt but was being imprisoned for
failure to comply with a valid order of the court.

In

L~r~~Clift•s Estate, 108 Utah 336 159 P.2d 872 (Utah 1945)
-7-

this court upheld a contempt conviction against an administrator of an estate for failure to comply with a valid

order of the court requiring him to pay over money to
his successor.

It seems that the necessity for the court

to enforce it's order to maintain respect for court processes, is present whether or not it is an order to pay
money.

The Supreme Courts of Washington and Colorado have

both upheld contempt convictions for failure to comply

with property settlements made in a divorce decree.

Both

decisions were based on the fact that the contempt was not
for failure to pay a debt but was for failure to obey a

valid order of the court.

Harvey v.

Harve~,

153 Colo. 15,

354 P.2d 265 (1963), Deck~v. Deck~, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326

P.2d332 (1958).
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF SETOFF WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT
JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THE COURT'S ORDER.
Appellant claLms that the court had insufficient
evidence upon which to base a contempt of court finding,
because appellant claimed a setoff.

Respondent submits

that there was sufficient evidence upon which the court
could and did reject appellant's claim of a setoff.

There

',ias evidence that the appellant's claim of setoff had been
cJ~:t"'n1inP<j l n be $ 45.00 by Judge Wilkins
·
· a previous
·
in

h"'a.ring.
-8-

"Q.

Now when we left Court that day do you
remember the judge said:

•Mr. Bott, I find the value of the property
she took from you was worth $90.00, but I
find the value of the property you owe her
is $45.00 so I give you a credit of $45.00.•
Is that what the judge said?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You understood that at the time.

A.

Yes."

In the court's findings of fact dated May 2, 1966,

(R. 82, 83

Judge Jeppson acknowledged and took account of the $45000
setoff granted by Judge Wilkins.

Judge Wilkins decision

on the amount of the setoff is conclusive against Judge
Jeppson in this case.

Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6

Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503, (1957), National Finance Co.
of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963).
There was clearly evidence upon which the claim of setoff
could be decided.

Respondent further submits that a claim of setoff
is not sufficient justification for refusal to obey a
valid order of the court.

It is said in 2 Nelson

E!_vorce and Annulment, 2 ed. (1961) 447:
"The husband cannot offset against his liability
for alimony or support payments his wife's
alleged indebtedness to him. In fact, it has
been held that the husband cannot even setoff
a judgment which he has obtained against his
-9-

wife, as the alimony decree is to provide for
her support and offsetting a judgment against
her claim would be ~o aid in this connection."
Keck v 0 Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 26 P.2d 300 (1933), and Wagner v.
~gner,

(La. App.) 134 So. 2d 670 (1961) are cited in support

of the above statement.
Respondent respectfully submits that the court
·properly denied appellant's defense of setoff o

POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE
FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE
SECOND CONTEMPT OF COURT FINDING.
Appellant contends that due to the fact that this
court reversed appellant's June 196 7 conviction for contempt of court, Utah Constitution Article I Section 12
prevents him from being tried again for the same contempt.
Respondent submits that the appellant's rights under
Article I Section 12 were not violated in this case.
The contempt of court finding on May 2, 1968, was
not based on the same contempt of which appellant was
convicted in June of 1967.

The contempt is for refusal

to obey a valid order of the court.

There is a continuing

violation until appellant obeys the order.

The respondent's

affidavit in support of the order to show cause (R. 77)
tn:ikt:s

of

it clear that this action was brought on the basis

ditferent facts than those in the action in June of 1967.,
-10-

The respondent stated "that the court June 21, 1967, adjudicated plaintiff's property claims against defendant and
allowed him credit of $45.00 therefore, but the plaintiff
ever since said time has still willfully refused to pay
defendant pursuant to the decree of divorce."
Appellant concedes that if this court based it's
decision overturning the first contempt conviction, on lack
of jurisdiction then double jeopardy does not apply.
cites State v. Empey, 65

u.

609, 239 P. 25 (1925).

He
However,

the appellant reasons that the court could not have jurisdiction for one reason but not for another and argued that
this court held that the trial court did have jurisdiction
to adjudicate the personal property claims.

As a result,

the court's decision was not based on lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent disagrees, there is no reason why the court
could not have jurisdiction to modify a property settlement
in a divorce decree under 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953),

while at the same time it's jurisdiction to find contempt
of court is limited for failure to file an affidavit under
78-32-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953).

A reading of this

court's decision Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d, 329, 437 P.2d
68 4 (1968) and Robinson v. City Court, 112 Utah 36, 185

t

)')8

(1947) relied on by the court, makes it clear

Llie

cuurt considers 78-32-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) '
-11-

-

a jurisdictional requirement.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT HAD POWER TO ENJOIN APPELLANT FROM
CONTINUING ANOTHER CIVIL ACTION NO. 178623 IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY AGAINST RESPONDENT.
Appellant contends that the independent suit in questior
Civil No. 178623, District Court, Salt Lake County, involves·
matters not adjudicated at the hearing before the Honorable

D. F. Wilkins in June of 1967.

Appellant also contends

that even if the property claims which are the subject of
Civil No. 178623 were adjudicated by Judge Wilkins in
June of 1967, res judicata must be plead in accordance
with Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and not by
enjoining appellant from bringing thE: suit.
Respondent respectfully submits that it is within
the power of the district court to enjoin a party from
bringing a suit based on the same factual issues which
have or could have been litigated in a previous suit.
~night v. Flat Top Mining Co., supra.; National Finance Co.
~f Provo v. Daley, supra.

The basis for such a power is

WelJ. stated in Favorite v. Minneapolis Street Railway

~mµa.!:X,, 91 N.W. 2d 459 (S. Ct., Minn., 1958) at Po 463:
"Repeated litigation of a right which has been
adjudicated with finality is without any legi1im'1tr> purpose and constitutes a vexatious and
"PPres.sive harrassment of a litigant in contravPntion of his right to a speedy and efficient
-12--

administration of justice. If successive suits
could be brought to litigate the same questions
between the same parties or their privies as
often as either should choose, remedial justice
would soon become a mere mockery."
Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is no bar to
the issuing of an injunction in this case.

This Rule

controls the point in the proceedings at which an affirmative
defense must be brought up, it has nothing to do with enjoini
the action completely.
Respondent further submits that the district court had
adequate evidence on which to base a finding that the propert
claims in Civil No. 178623 were adjudicated or could have

I

been adjudicated before Judge Wilkins in June of 1967.
Appellant cannot contend that he did have an adequate chance
to present evidence to Judge Jeppson that the property
claims in Civil No. 178623 were not the same as those
before Judge Wilkins in June, 1967.

The appellant was

ordered to show cause why the injunction should not issue,
in the order dated April 12, 1968 (R. 76), and respondent
stated in her supporting affidavit (R. 77) that the appellant
has

"contemptuously filed a suit in Third District Court

against defendant claiming damages of $2000.00 for said
Property already adjudicated."
°'!'r'"-'11ant did
11
'

hfrh could

Yet, it must be noted that

not even bring the file for Civil No. 178623

have easily settled the whole matter.
-13-

The

appellant's attorney admitted that the property which was
the subject of Civil No. 178623 had been taken before June
of 1967.

"THE COURT: Prior to that date--were they taken
prior to the date of the hearing?

MR. COTRO-MANES:

Yes, not brought out, so no res
adjudicata on those goods." (R. 109, 110)
It was upon the appellant to bring out evidence if

any there was justifying why the claim was not made before
Judge Wilkins.

If there was not justification for failure

to make the claim, appellant will now be barred from bringing
the claim up.
National

Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., supra;

~inance

Company of Provo v. Daley, supra.

From

this it is clear that there was sufficient basis for a
finding that the property claims were or could have been
adjudicated before Judge Wilkins in June 1967.
POINT V
IT WAS WITHIN THE COURT'S POWER TO INCREASE THE
SENTENCE TO FIFTEEN DAYS IN JAIL.
Appellant contends that the court cannot increase
Punishment at a second trial where the first conviction
\

has been reversed on appeal.
i n1

,n

rease in punishment would have a chilling effect on

if'r '°' l lrl_n t..' s
1

.

Appellant reasons that such

"PPea} •

assertion of his constitutional right to an

He cites United States v. Jackson,
-14-

u.s.

20 L.ed.

2d 138, 88 s.ct.

~- (1968)

for the general rule that a

court should not penalize those who exercise their constitutional rights.
Respondent agrees that the court cannot penalize
those who exercise their constitutional rights.

However,

there is no reason to think the court has violated this
rule in the present case.

The contempt in this case was

a continuing contempt and the court very well could have
determined that a greater jail term had become necessary
in order to force appellant to obey the orders of the
court.

The court very well could have determined that

other factors were much more important than the slight
chilling effect involved in this caseu

There is no

evidence that it was the court's purpose to penalize
appellant for exercising his right of appeal.

See

Rice v. Simpson, (USDC Ala., 9-26-67), 2 Criminal Law
Reporter. 2068; State v. Jacques,

(N.J. Sup. Ct., 10-7-68)

4 Criminal Law Reporter 2075; cf Palko v. Connecticut,
302

u.s.

319 (1937).

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court
L the trial court properly held appellant in contempt
('LJlL

and sentenced him to 15 days in the county jail
-15-

for failure to obey the divorce decree.

It is also res-

pectfully submitted that the trial court properly enjoined
appellant from continuing a suit involving facts that had
already been decided in the present case.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronald N. Boyce
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services, Inc.
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

